

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY POLITICS IN INDONESIA'S 2019 ELECTION CAMPAIGN ON TWITTER AND ITS SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

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Abstract

This paper explains the use of hate spin as a tool of identity politics in the presidential elections 2019 on Twitter by hate spin agents. Used Cherian George's hate spin concept, which includes tactical flexibility, distributed efforts, and symbolic contention, and the tweets were analyzed using sentiment analysis. According to the findings of sentiment analysis, three variables are being leveraged by hate spin agents on Twitter during the 2019 presidential election campaign. After training test data, tweets were dominated by negative sentiment; tweets with hashtag abundant resulted in 807 negative and 323 positive, with a Naïve Bayes model of 0.995 (99.5%). Hate spin campaigns have negative consequences for Indonesia and the country's democracy because they foster sharp differences and intolerance toward the identities of other groups, causing societal divisions that have the potential to lead to identity conflict, genocide, or national division if not managed well and taken seriously by the government and the nations itself.

Keywords: *Identity Politics, Elections, Hate Spin, Democracy, Sentiment Analysis, Constructivism*

Abstrak

Tulisan ini berusaha untuk menjelaskan penggunaan hate spin sebagai alat politik identitas dalam pemilihan presiden 2019 di X yang sebelumnya bernama Twitter oleh agen hate spin. Dengan menggunakan konsep hate spin dari Cherian George, yang mencakup fleksibilitas taktis, upaya terdistribusi, dan pertentangan simbolis, dan tweet dianalisis menggunakan analisis sentimen. Menurut temuan analisis sentimen, tiga variabel dimanfaatkan oleh agen hate spin di X selama kampanye pemilihan presiden 2019. Setelah melewati pengujian data, terdapat tiga pola yakni tweet didominasi oleh sentimen negatif; tweet dengan tagar berlimpah menghasilkan 807 negatif dan 323 positif, dengan model Naïve Bayes sebesar 0,995 (99,5%). Kampanye hate spin memiliki konsekuensi negatif bagi Indonesia dan demokrasi karena mendorong perbedaan tajam dan intoleransi terhadap identitas kelompok lain, yang menyebabkan perpecahan masyarakat dimana hal itu berpotensi mengarah pada konflik identitas, genosida, atau perpecahan nasional jika tidak dikelola dengan baik dan ditanggapi dengan serius oleh pemerintah dan negara itu sendiri.

Kata Kunci: Politik Identitas, Pemilihan Umum, Pemutarbalikan Kebencian, Demokrasi, Analisis Sentimen, Konstruktivisme

Introduction

Indonesia stands as a nation committed to a democratic system, wherein democracy is construed as a governance model wherein power emanates from the populace, and it is the people who establish the rules that safeguard and advance their rights. Democracy, coupled with the conduct of general elections, constitutes integral facets of contemporary governmental structures, wielding the capacity to delineate a country's vision and articulate the sentiments of its citizenry. Over recent years, the dynamics of democracy and electoral procedures have been subject to the influence of ongoing globalization trends, consequently shaping the political panorama across diverse societies. The essence of democracy lies in empowering the people and safeguarding individual rights. Elections, as a manifestation of democratic governance, are pivotal in appointing representatives tasked with guiding policy formulation and legislating laws reflective of the citizenry's aspirations. The electoral process has undergone significant evolution, marked by the integration of practices and technologies, as well as shifts in campaign strategies facilitated by the advent of social media (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018)

Jurgen Habermas established the theoretical groundwork for discovering public space as a setting where citizens engage in rational-critical discourse to affect public opinion by embracing public space. (Habermas et al., 1989). The advent of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has altered the concept of digital public space. ICT has made the platform accessible to all and has profoundly impacted the dynamics of public discourse. In the last ten years, the advancement of digital technology has produced an inclusive online realm that transcends geographical boundaries, allowing a diverse range of perspectives to be heard globally. This digital public space, which includes anything from social media platforms to online forums, is a place to share information, communicate with others, and express different points of view.

Access to these spaces has become more democratic, allowing people from a broad spectrum of backgrounds to participate in

discussions about social, political, and cultural concerns. (Roberts, 2015). As of January 2018, Indonesia's number of active social media users exceeded 130 million, representing 49% of the entire population. Then, according to the most recent data from WeAreSocial, there was an increase to 150 million users with a total penetration of 56% of the total population in January 2019, with an average time spent on social media of 3 hours and 26 minutes. Twitter became one of Twitter's most frequently opened and actively used social media users in 2018, at 27%, which increased to 52% in January 2019 (Kemp 2022).

Twitter has evolved into a digital public place critical to the political process. As a digital public space, Twitter has evolved into a dynamic venue for political discourse, election-related conversations, and public participation, profoundly influencing how elections are organized and seen in the digital era. One of its most significant consequences on elections is its potential to democratize knowledge. This information democratization equalizes positions, allowing more votes and perspectives to contribute to electoral discourse. So that people can make better decisions and participate in debates about various political topics (Jennings & John, 2009). The specialists investigate how political actors use Twitter as a technique to communicate, generate support, and form public opinion. Richard Davis explains in his book that Twitter has been utilized as a method of political communication to promote campaign messaging. Twitter is also an area for direct engagement between candidates and the general public and an engaged political debate. While Twitter and other social media platforms have democratized political speech, they have also raised issues about misinformation and public opinion manipulation (Davis et al., 2017).

With 124 million tweets regarding the election, the 2019 Indonesian election campaign is very captivating on Twitter (Yudhawiranata 2019). However, some campaigns emphasize identity politics." Identity politics" refers to political activity and elections based on social

identities such as tribe, religion, ethnicity, gender, or other cultural association. In Indonesia, where cultures and religions are many, identity policy is frequently related to election choices, resulting in complex and diverse political processes.

In the 2019 presidential contest, the political identity regarding religion is most prominent. Indonesia, with the immense majority of Muslims in the world, sees religious identity as a central issue. President Joko Widodo, better known as Jokowi, faces his opponent, Prabowo Subianto, a former general with a solid conservative Muslim backing base. Election campaigns showed polarisation of voters based on religion, with issues related to Islamic identity, piety, and conservatism prevailing. Conservative Islamic groups in Indonesia, often associated with rising religious spirits, support Prabowo, viewing him as a candidate who can represent their interests and better uphold Islamic values. These groups expressed concern about the influence of liberal ideology and sought leaders who could protect the country's Muslim identity.

On the other hand, Jokowi's supporters, although diverse, include many who advocate a more pluralistic and inclusive vision of Indonesia's identity, emphasizing unity in diversity and focusing on economic and infrastructure development. The political phenomenon of identity in the 2019 presidential election highlights the complexity of facing a diverse society where religious and cultural identity is intertwined with political choices. (Aspinall et al., 2020)

Identity politics issues in religion in social media escalated at the end of 2016 when Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), a Christian minority and the Governor of DKI Jakarta, was affected by a religious case and was the beginning of the occurrence of hate-spin or hate spinning. Extremist groups and political actors use social media platforms and messaging applications to spread false information, manipulate public opinion, and promote hatred toward Ahok. They utilize religion as a dividing weapon, capitalizing on the conservative sentiments of the Muslim majority to generate support for

Anies Baswedan. The phenomena have evolved into real-world protests and marches, with hardline groups mobilizing enormous crowds to demand Ahok's arrest and punishment for religious blasphemy (Afif et al., 2022).

For further understanding, researchers refer to the book titled *Hate Spin: The Manufacture of Religious Offense and Its Threat to Democracy*, written by Cherian George (George, 2016). Hate Spin is a twin-political strategy to provoke anger, exploit group identity to mobilize supporters and suppress opponents. In launching his action, Agent Hate Spin applied the following variable-variable tactics: tactical flexibility by adjusting their messages to be accepted by a particular audience, exploiting prejudice, and manipulating social tensions to their advantage. Distributed efforts, in an effort to spread messages from actors or groups that are decentralized from individual groups to extremist groups, often take refuge in anonymity in digital public spaces so that hate speech can spread rapidly and across diverse social networks. Symbolic contention is implemented through the use of symbols, rhetoric, and cultural references to arouse emotions and provoke sentiments that divide between different social and religious groups. The concept of Hate Spin is attached to the formation or construction of ideas or ideas "w" and "other" embedded in the recipient (George, 2016).

Religious identity politics in Indonesia, particularly during the 2019 elections, have become exciting research since the identity policies implemented in 2019 include numerous identity-based criteria, such as religion and ethnicity, which can influence political dynamics and voter behavior. The religious affiliation inherent in candidates plays an important role, and identity factors influence electoral strategies, mobilizations, and campaign narratives that can give a different understanding of identity. The election results also influenced the country's vision of Indonesian diplomatic relations at the regional and global levels. Identity politics with the Hate Spin strategy is a challenge for the government and the Indonesian nation as it brings down political opponents with hate speech and negative sentiment so that someone disrespects

others because of identity differences, hate-spin agents construct it by fostering ideas and ideas that emphasize the patterns of intolerance contained in hate spin through, or it may lead to the nation's disintegration. This research aims to provide insight into how political parties or political actors can navigate and use identity-based divisions to gain an advantage in elections by analyzing the strategies used by hate spin agents in framing narratives about identity that can provide their listeners with different understandings of identity and politics.

Method

The type of research that will be used uses the type of quantitative research. Quantitative research is based on an understanding of the philosophy of positivism and uses data that are facts and figures in the research process (Silalahi, 2009). The method was chosen because it was based on the purpose of this research to demonstrate the use of Hate Spin in the 2019 presidential campaign on Twitter by using quantitative data obtained factually and can be analyzed statistically to identify patterns, relationships, and sentimental trends in the data set. The researchers used qualitative descriptive methods to analyze and describe the data that had been collected (Silalahi, 2009). The data will result in an analysis and description of the hate spin phenomenon on Twitter during the campaign, variables of hate spin such as tactical flexibility, distributed efforts, and symbolic contention. By describing this, the researchers aim to prove the fact or reality of the campaign of the presidential election 2019 using hate spin.




Figure 1: Flow of Analysis Sentiment with Naive Bayes Classification

The study was conducted with sentimental analysis to identify the sentiment contained in the text and classify its polarity as positive, negative, neutral, or unrelated to a particular

topic (Ragini et al., 2018). The process is through web-scraping data on Twitter using Python 3 and the Jupyter Notebook tool, and data is analyzed using sentiment analysis techniques that are part of the NLP (natural language processing) method to automatically analyze (Hausmann et al., 2020) in text through computational processes such as text containing sentiments, emotions, opinions, attitudes and subjectivity about a particular topic or towards an entity (Medhat et al., 2014). The research uses the Naïve Bayes Classifier algorithm because it makes it easier for researchers to process large datasets, and the Naïve Bayes Classifier is capable of processing fast and time-efficient data sets training, so it is suitable for large data sets, compared to the slow Support Vector Machine (SVM) in data training.

Discussion

Based on the research findings, the 2019 Indonesian election campaign on social media Twitter has intolerant behavior, scoring several negative scores on the confusion matrix 807. There are 3,317 negative labels and 1,339 positive labels among the total number of stamps already labeled. According to the data, there are more negative impressions of the three hashtags that researchers use as keywords and filters. The electoral political campaign was supposed to be a means for the public to obtain information about the ideas promised by the presidential candidate. However, the campaign period that lasted from October 2018 to April 2019 was dominated by campaign information that capitalized on religious issues, SARA, hate speech, hoax information, and labeling political candidates with inappropriate language, like some of the tweets below that the researchers managed to obtain.

Table 1: Labelled Sentiment from Twitter

Text	Label and Score
Hanya PKI yg suka adu domba antar Umat Beragama & Antar Golongan Beragama!!!! Jgn percaya tipu daya Antek2 PKI!!!! Umat Islam Radikal, Intoleran, tak Berbhinneka, tak Pancasila, Ingin tegakkan Khilafah.. Semua Itu hanya Propaganda PKI!!!! #2019GantiPresiden #2019PrabowoPresiden	Negative (-10)

Text	Label and Score
makanya cebong benci luar biasa thdp pa anies dan terus tebar fitnah kalo Jakarta jd rusak skrg. Stelah rezim berganti, para pemfitnah itu hrs dilaporkan dan dihukum harus tegak atas mrk, tidak spt skrg, mrk terus terlindung dari hukum... #2019GantiPresiden	Negative (-5)
Tahun 2019 orang gila, sinting, miring stress dan tidak waras boleh memilih presiden asalkan tidak kambuh...yang gila itu siapa ya...apa orang gilanya atau orang yang pura pura gila ya... #2019gantipresiden #2019prabowosandi #2019adilmakmur #salingfollow	Negative (-8)
Salah besar klu ummat islam ditakut2-in maca mini, ummat islam malah mengharap kedatangan mereka, krn bagi ummat islam "musuh tdk dicari, bertemu musuh haram hukumnya lari dr musuh" #2019GantiPResiden "gerakan ini siap pukul mundur massa reuni alumni 212"	Negative (-11)
Bangga terhadap presiden Jokowi yang berani melakukan inovasi dan tetap jaga stabilitas negara #2019TetapJokowi #2019PilihJokowi #JumatBerkah	Positive (5)
Jaga persatuan tetap harmonis mari cipta pileg dan pilpres 2019 aman, damai dan sejuk #imbauanpolri #pemiludamai #SatgasNusantara #polressragen #humaspolressragen #sragenguyubrukun #Sragenkeren #pemiluamandamaisejuk #pemiludamai #pemilu2019 #pileg2019 #pilpres2019	Positive (5)
Siap bang, kita mah selalu damai. Yuuk mantapkan hati menuju Indonesia Adil dan Makmur bersama Prabowo Sandi #2019GantiPresiden #2019PrabowoSandi	Positive (3)
Bismillahirrohmannirrohim... pak @prabowo dan @sandiuo memenangkan kontestasi pemilu 2019. Menjadi presiden amanah. Berdaulat adil dan makmur. Amiinakan saudara Jangan lupa RT, dan like. #2019GantiPresiden #AdilMakmur #PrabowoSandi #2019PrabowoSandi	Semoga Positive (3)

This research gained the content of tweets uploaded from various anonymous accounts with the same 1,884 tweets that the researchers found or labeled as buzzers. Buzzers managed by political actors utilize the buzzer to dominate Twitter conversations. This is consistent with Puskapol UI conclusions in 2019 regarding the presence of the buzzer industry in the 2019 election campaign. Puskapol UI finds that the buzzers industry is used to amplify existing

issues with every tweet, and he adds a unique tag to add a hashtag campaign and embeds certain news to enhance the credibility of the content (Puskapol UI, 2019).

The results of the researchers with the Naïve Bayes Classification Sentiment Analysis there was a total data set of 8,429 tweets (raw datasets), and researchers successfully completed the sentiment analysis and obtained the TF-IDF performance results as follows:

Table 2: Result of Confusion Matrix

Prediction	Actual Value	
	Negative	Positive
Negative	807 (true negative)	0 (false negative)
Positive	2 (false positive)	323 (true positive)

A raw data set of 8,429 tweets was collected and processed to produce an accurate prediction score of 807 for a negative classification with an error of 0 and an optimistic prediction of 323 with an error of two utilizing TF-IDF.

Overall Statistics

Accuracy: 0.995 (99,5%)

95 CI: 0.9902, 0.9978

Kappa: 0.992McNemar'ss Test P-Value: 0.4459

	Negative Class	Positive Class
Specificity	0.9987	0.9969
Pos Pred Value	0.9988	0.9878
Neg Pred Value	0.9950	0.9992
Precision	0.9988	0.9878
Recall	0.9951	0.9969
F1Measure	0.9969	0.9923
Prevalence	0.5047	0.2016
Detection Rate	0.5022	0.2010
Detection Prevalence	0.5028	0.2035
Balanced Accuracy	0.9969	0.9969

It can be concluded that the performance of sentiment analysis naïve Bayes classifier using weighting term frequency-inverse document frequency generates a confusion matrix with 807 negative stated valid with 0 false and 323 positive stated true with two false based on the previous description. The total statistical correctness demonstrated that 0.995 (99.5%) of the model is claimed to be accurate in processing the dataset.



Figure 2: WordCloud Visualization

This research produces data visualization in the form of the word cloud. Wordcloud shows data in the form of text depicted in a visualization where the size of the text depends on the frequency of occurrence of the word in a text or tweet. The most significant word in a word cloud is a mode in existing text data, and visual word cloud data in the dataset tested shows some large text or most appear as *Allah* (1015), *Islam* (352), *bohong* (147), *cebong* (394), *rakyat* (551), *dukung* (602), *partai* (280), *pilih* (529), among others.

In this section, netizens only focused on the background of the presidential candidate figure rather than discussing the vision, mission, and work plan promised by the candidates. Some other word clouds are *Ulama* (197), *Tauhid* (34), HTI 30 and labeled the candidates using animal name or negative sentiment like *Cebong* (394), *Hoax* (124), *Bong* (54), *Sontoloyo* (42), *Kampret* (41), and *Tenggelam* (36). Tweets with negative sentiments dominate tweets that use these words or labels and tend to use religious language, and these tweets promote intolerance by dressing religion in tweets; here are examples of tweets that researchers found:

Partai Sontoloyo. Semakin dekat hari pencoblosan Allah semakin buka siapa musuh2 Islam. Semoga ulama dan umat Islam diberikan kekuatan menghancurkan musuh2 Islam. Aamiin #2019GantiPresiden #2019PrabowoSandi (AlizamWahab 12/11/2018)

@MardaniAliSera Survey bani cebong ga usah dipercaya. Dulu napi penista agama

ahok semua lembaga survey mana ada yg berani bilang kalah, semua bilang ahok pasti menang. Tapi karena kuasa ALLAH SWT akhirnya napi penista agama kalah masuk bui. #2019GantiPresiden #2019PrabowoSandi (RudyWij4y4 27/09/2018)




Figure 3: Social Network Analysis Visualization

The researchers made a visualization mapping of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and produced an image in the form of a network of tweets that tweet each other about the same thing, namely the three hashtags *#Pemilu2019*, *#2019GantiPresiden* and *#2019TetapJokowi*. The visualization is made to see the modularity. Graph Modularity on this tweet network is intended to divide a network into communities or groups, and there are three camps, namely *#Pemilu2019*, *#2019GantiPresiden*, and *#2019TetapJokowi*.

The visualization of SNA shows the polarization of groups into two groups, namely, the group that is part of *#2019GantiPresiden* is the group of Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno, and *#2019TetapJokowi* is the group of Joko Widodo –Ma'ruff Amin. Tweets from government institutions dominate a *#Pemilu2019* group. In both groups, the polarization is dominated by Hate Spin tweets that are used as a 2019 election campaign strategy with hate speech tweets, primarily the *#2019GantiPresident* group often uses hate spin strategies with words that tend to label Joko Widodo by constructing readers' thoughts that

Jokowi as a leader who is close to foreigners and does not have good performance, even does not have alignment with the people. Polarization of politics leads to group divisions in society due to differences in political views caused by intolerance and hate speech using hate spin.

Hate Spin as a Negative Electoral Political Campaign Strategy

The hate spin that occurred in the 2019 election is a residue of the 2014 presidential election fight and a repeat between Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, where there is polarization in the party that supports both candidates. Then, the escalation of identity politics occurred with the use of hate spin in 2016, carried out by Buni Yani to Ahok during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election campaign. Buni Yani's upload received widespread attention on social media, inviting the anger of Islamic groups and making the masses move to action 212. As a result, polarization residues were created in society in the 2019 presidential election campaign. Prabowo Subianto uses narratives about government elites who are judged to be corrupt and only side with foreign interests. Researchers looked during the data crawling process to the confusion matrix evaluation process to get tweets that were dominated by religious identity and emphasized the Hate Spin strategy. This research found that there are three variables used in identity politics with the hate spin strategy during the 2019 presidential election on Twitter, including using tactical flexibility, distributed efforts, and symbolic contention.

Hate spin agents use tactical flexibility on Twitter by raising controversial issues that can provoke their readers. Hate and hate spin agents adjust their messages to be accepted by readers or targets, namely Muslim groups or grassroots-level communities. This anger propaganda is used to strengthen mobility. Here is a tweet that researchers found related to tactical flexibility:

@mayiloveu2 @KoRnHurry Mungkin Bentar lagi juga ada program Asu untuk Kampret KIK = KARTU IDENTITAS KAMPRET Bukti pilih pemimpin yang coba2 hasilnya seperti ini DKI sudah salah pilih pemimpin Indonesia jangan

sampai salah lagi #2019TetapJokowi” (@mazmaulan4 pada 13/10/2018)

Aniaya itu Nyata!!! Bukan Hoax!!!! Cebong sukanya main Sniper, Aniaya, Persekusi, Kriminalisasi!!!! Begitulah Sikap Asli Cebong alias antek2 Neo-PKI!!! #2019GantiPresiden #2019PrabowoPresiden #2019TetapAntiPKI #2019DiaTakutDiganti (@SaveCoronaID 13/10/2018)

It can be analyzed that the similarities between the two tweets above are controversial issues that judge Jokowi as a failed leader and unfit to be elected in the next period and tweets that promote identity supremacy and scapegoat certain groups for their misfortunes and disseminate information that is not necessarily the truth. In the tweet above, the agent makes a controversial issue, so Jokowi, labeled a Neo PKI henchman, is not elected again and is replaced by an opposition candidate. Labeling uses propaganda techniques, where agents use the labeling of presidential candidates as a tool for social construction and shaping public opinion.

The researchers discovered that the 2019 election campaign on Twitter displayed diverse and widely distributed efforts. These efforts encompassed the distribution of messages through the buzzer industry, extreme groups, grassroots communities, and anonymous account owners. The utilization of distributed efforts is considered adequate for hate spin agents as it facilitates the rapid dissemination and accessibility of such content to readers, enabling its redistribution. Researchers discovered that this content is often crafted using dog-whistling, which involves conveying messages that may not be comprehensible to the general public but are distinctly discernible by the targeted group, specifically Muslim voters. Communicating in this manner is seen as beneficial by expressing ideas or symbols associated with the peak period of a collective.

Bendera Rosulallah adalah bendera kami Ummat Islam ! Bendera Merah Putih adalah bendera negara kami Indonesia ! Kalian kaum Kafir silahkan saja kibarkan bendera agama kalian ! Kalian kaum muslim Munafik punya bendera ? Kibarkanlah ! #2019GantiPresiden <https://t.co/MNY3KYabfP> (AkunPanglima 30/09/18)

The above content is used so that it is only audible or easily understood by certain groups by raising the narrative that “*Bendera Rasulullah*” is the flag of the “*Ummat Islam.*” Other narratives raise labeling for Joko Widodo, who is labeled as a “Kafir”. It is used by hate-spin groups in its dissemination in order to construct readers’ thoughts that Joko Widodo is part of a kafir group and is not pro-*pribumi*. Then, the researchers get the existence of tweets that come from distributed efforts with the help of the buzzer industry from both partners. Based on these findings, both sides attack each other using buzzers, but there are differences between the buzzers on the side of Joko Widodo and Prabowo. The Buzzer from Joko Widodo tends to emphasize the context of cleaning up Jokowi’s name, which is considered and labeled as less Islamic, close to a foreign citizen, and labeled as part of the PKI group, the Jokowi camp buzzer tends to homogenize its content so that it is more structured, one of which is as below:

“Ayo bergerak dibidang masing2, bergerak dengan kemampuan masing2, bergerak dengan cara masing2, bergerak dengan komunitas masing2.. Untuk memenangkan Jokowi. Kita bertekad utk menggenapkan kepemimpinan Jokowi hingga 2 periode..!! #Jokowi2P-eriode #2019TetapJokowi” (119 duplicates founded)

Compared to the buzzer from the Prabowo Subianto group, their messaging highlights the notion that their political rivals are of unworthy quality, foreign interests are manipulating the government’s elite, the political elite is corrupt, and they position themselves as the savior of the nation and a resolute leader capable of resolving Indonesia’s challenges. Additionally, Prabowo’s buzzers tend to lack a specific focus, unlike Jokowi’s buzzers, which engage in everyday conversations on Twitter and employ hashtags to create the appearance of virality. According to the tweet, it is claimed that Prabowo’s team of buzzers created the following message.

@Surgabidadari3 Mohon ampun ya Allah kenapa hamba sangat muak melihat wajah pemimpin rejim ini hamba muak melihat tingkah lakunya yg gampang sekali brjanji tp berat skli memenuhinya mungkin hanya #2019Ganti-

Presiden #2019PrabowoSandi yg akan menghilangkan rasa muak ini ya Allah....” (Nasser25015377 31/10/2018)

“#2019GANTIPRESIDEN Jika Bukan Antek Cina Komunis Coba Buktikan !! HTI Sudah Dibubarkan Giliran PSI Anti Pancasila Anti Agama Harusnya Juga Di Bubarkan !! (Hukum Tidak Boleh Tebang Pilih)” (CalegPilih 17/11/2018)

In the end, the researchers discovered symbolic contention in this research, wherein agents of hate spin utilize symbols to create a sense of purity within society by highlighting contentious topics that contradict their symbolic ideals. Hate spin agents are indifferent to the tangible achievement or subsequent implementation of the protest objective. Their sole aim is symbolic, namely, to enforce Islamic Sharia values in Indonesia. They collaborate with the political elite to ensure their interests are acknowledged. Hate-driven campaigns tend to occur consistently and repeatedly during periods of elections. Throughout the election, the hate spin organization successfully fulfilled its symbolic objective. The following are the research findings pertaining to tweets containing symbolic opposition:

Yg menumpas pembontakan PKI di Madiun adalah Pak Mukidi Yg menggagalkan Kudeta PKI pd tahun 1965 adalah Pak Mukidi jg Pak mukidi-lah satu2nya pahlawan revolusi Indonesia Tanpa Pak Mukidi Indonesia dipastikan sudah menjadi negara komunis #2019Ganti-Presiden (Asan_Almadury 29/09/2018)

Tim Jokowi yang Diisi Partai Terkorup harusnya sadar diri Ngaca!!!! PDIP Golkar adalah Partai Terkorup Partai Utama Pendukung Jokowi!!!! Apa bukan Koalisi Koruptor Namanya??? #2019GantiPresiden #2019PrabowoPresiden #2019TetapAntiPKI #2019DiaTakuDiganti (SaveCoronaID 28/11/2018)

PKI itu benang merahnya selalu takut dengan perda2 syariah ingat indonesia itu mayoritas Muslim Apakah partai yg akan larang perda Syariah ada neo komunisnya #2019Ganti-Presiden #2019PrabowoSandi #JumatBerkah (kang_zam777 22/11/2018)

The issues raised for the controversy played out during the electoral political campaign include the issue of the rise of the PKI in Indonesia, the performance of Joko

Widodo, who is considered to have no results and corruption, the issue of Joko Widodo close to foreigners, and government elites who are not pro-*pribumi*. The controversial issue above is an issue that is played so that later, the public will not vote for Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin and influence public opinion to vote for Prabowo-Sandi.

Religious identity politics with hate spin that occurred during the 2019 election campaign has been successfully carried out by hate spin agents by launching a hate spin strategy on social media and is part of the 2014 general election residue and escalation in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Governor election. This is in line with research conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the University of Indonesia (Puskapol UI) titled *Managing Identity Politics in the 2019 election*, describing the findings, namely the 2019 presidential election, there is identity politicization in the campaign, predominantly carried out by both camps who attack each other and accuse each other of who is doing identity politics in his, identity politicization that occurred in the 2019 election campaign was emphasized by Puskapol UI that it was part of the residue of political polarization in the 2014 election and the 2017 DKI Jakarta Governor election (Puskapol UI, 2019).

Observing the highly diverse Indonesian society, which predominantly consists of Muslims, incites hate propagandists to advocate for Muslim leaders and a homogenous society. They also seek legal policies that only safeguard hate propagandists and their supporters. Hate spin agents effectively exploit social media to provoke anger or hatred towards Joko Widodo, primarily by raising controversial issues such as his perceived lack of adherence to Islam, close relations with China, and being labeled as an “*Antek PKI*.” These extremist groups and hate spin agents strategically frame these narratives to capitalize on opposition to Joko Widodo, including from Muslim leaders who seek to align themselves with the public. In this instance, Prabowo is portrayed as a visionary figure who aims to enhance the prospects of the Indonesian nation by aligning himself with the indigenous population.

Propaganda operatives employ a network to expedite the dissemination of words and acts, thereby maximizing their reach. This influences public opinion and generates trends, particularly concerning Joko Widodo, by strategically framing and promoting problematic issues. Researchers have demonstrated that throughout the 2019 election campaign season on Twitter, they achieved very accurate statistical results showing a higher prevalence of negative sentiment. Specifically, they found that 99.5% of the models used to process the dataset accurately determined sentiment. A model network further corroborates this, and a social network analysis (refer to Figure 3) demonstrates that groups became polarized into three distinct groups during the 2019 election campaign. These groups include the Joko Widodo – Ma'ruff Amin support group, identified by the hashtag #2019TetapJokowi, the Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga Uno support group, identified by the hashtag #2019GantiPresident, and finally, the #Pemilu2019 group, which is mainly composed of government organizations and the public.

Implications of Hate Spin on Indonesia's socio-political landscape

Considering Indonesia's plurality of religions and races, it is imperative to have leaders who have the capability to handle this diversity effectively. Technology can play a crucial role in enhancing democracy in the modern era. Social media, in particular, can accelerate the dissemination of information and promote transparency, especially during elections. It can serve as a digital platform for public opinion. However, the prevalence of identity politics and the utilization of hate spin tactics during the 2019 election campaign has had significant consequences for social unity, political stability, and national well-being.

The mixture of identity politics and hate spin has the potential to worsen existing societal tensions. When political actors manipulate religious, ethnic, or cultural affiliations to generate purposeful distortions

and complications, they intensify pre-existing conflicts and cultivate animosity or antagonism among groups with distinct identities. This results in a society divided into distinct groups, with individuals aligning solely with a specific group's identity rather than a shared identity, such as national identity or the identity of being part of a single nation, namely *Bangsa Indonesia*. Consequently, this polarization fueled by animosity undermines the concept of national unity. The emergence of hate spin leads to the proliferation of hate speech, which has the capacity to create divisions throughout society. In his book "Hate Spin: The Manufacture of Religious Offense and Its Threat to Democracy" (2016), George explains that hate spin is a deliberate technique that involves spreading offensive content and creating divisions within society. This strategy aims to polarize society by manipulating narratives based on identity. George argues that frequently, these malicious distortions rooted in religious and ethnic settings function as instruments to promote division by amplifying the presence of disparities and fostering a perception of "us versus them" that can undermine a collective national identity (George, 2016). The polarization or divide in society following the 2019 election results from the lingering effects of the electoral political conflicts that arose during the 2014 election and persisted during the 2017 DKI Jakarta Governor election. The 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election controversy mirrored the previous trend observed in 2014 and was subsequently replicated in the 2019 presidential election. Four distinct factions are involved: Joko Widodo's supporters, Ahok's supporters, Prabowo's supporters, and Anies's supporters. Joko Widodo and Ahok receive support from nationalist factions as well as certain moderate Islamist factions, but their opponents, Prabowo and Anies, garner backing from orthodox Islamist factions. The division would undermine the significance of the *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* concept as the amplification of animosity highlights intolerance and discrimination, posing a challenge for the Indonesian people and the government to uphold national unity amidst political fluctuations.

Furthermore, this manifestation of hate spin carries significant implications for Indonesian democracy. As a relatively nascent democracy, the archipelago grapples with its identity's intricate nature, which has fostered the emergence of intolerant groups. The researchers' findings reveal that tweets from intolerant groups, who prioritize religious values over tolerance towards other identities, tend to promote divided identities. These tweets create a distinction of "us vs. them," pitting Muslim local groups against corrupt and foreign elite groups. The intention behind this is to strengthen the national identity of One Nation, Indonesia. The tweet was posted by a support group affiliated with Prabowo, which is primarily composed of conservative Muslim organizations, including the alumni of the Mass 212 movement, such as FPI and GNPf Ulama. These organizations have shown strong support for Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 election, as reported by PinterPolitik (PinterPolitik 2019). The social network analysis reveals that researchers derived this from sentiment analysis data. It indicates that the #2019GantiPresiden network is more extensive than the #2019TetapJokowi group. The sentiment analysis of tweets about the 2019 election shows a predominance of negative sentiment with an accuracy of 99.5%. According to research undertaken by Eve Warburton in the Journal of Carnegie Endowment, there is a deterioration in democracy in Indonesia (Charoters & O'Donohue, 2020). Warburton stated that the polarization of electoral fights in 2014, 2017, and 2019 contributed to the deterioration of Indonesian democracy standards. Following Jokowi's election in 2019, he took steps to alleviate the polarization that had arisen. He accomplished this by implementing a ban on HTI-related and other radical Islamic groups in Indonesia. This was achieved by issuing a presidential regulation granting significant power to the executive branch to prohibit the activities of groups that do not adhere to nationalist principles or violate Pancasila.

Conclusion

Indonesia, being relatively fresh to the practice of democracy, faces numerous issues that both the nation and its governance must face. One of these challenges is the proliferation of hate speech, which significantly impacts the political dynamics, particularly during general elections. The utilization of identity politics, coupled with a strategy of spreading hatred, was initially employed during the 2017 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election. This approach had a lingering impact that persisted until the 2019 presidential general election. The Twitter feud between followers of Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto in the election has been an intriguing research subject. This is due to the campaigns conducted on online platforms, which have exhibited intolerance, promotion of identity dominance, and the exacerbation of social divisions. The research collected a total of 8,429 tweets as data and performed sentiment analysis to classify the sentiment of each tweet. The analysis revealed that 807 were classified as negative sentiment out of the analyzed tweets, while only 323 were classified as positive sentiment. Evidence has demonstrated the utilization of hate propaganda throughout the 2019 election campaign, which carries significant consequences for societal well-being, national stability, and governance.

The utilization of hate spin carries significant and severe implications within the community, impacting the nation's continuity and governance. The article on hate spin creates a distinct and divisive separation within the nation, focusing solely on religious identity while neglecting the unifying national identity. If adequately managed, identity politics can foster solidarity among groups sharing the same identity and experiences, cultivating unity and mutual support. In this case, it can be employed to promote the cohesion of diverse identities, such as the Indonesian people who have collectively faced historical challenges. However, it is crucial to avoid the reckless manipulation of identity politics, which can lead to the harmful division of the Indonesian nation into opposing certain groups. Prolonged occurrence of such gaps can lead to heightened social polarization

and the potential fragmentation of the nation and state as the nation and society struggle to address these divergences effectively.

The decline of democratic foundations due to hate propaganda can be mitigated via collaborative activities undertaken by nations and governments. Adopting and fostering democracy is a multifaceted task requiring several stakeholders' involvement. Following the completion of this research, the researchers have received recommendations that are anticipated to be implemented by both the government and the multi-level community. The government, in particular, should develop targeted media literacy programs for the community in light of the rapid expansion of information. Individuals must possess the ability to identify between reliable information and false or false content. Through this initiative, the community will be motivated to adopt a critical mindset in assessing news sources and identifying potential biases.

Furthermore, facilitating open and inclusive communication among diverse communities to cultivate comprehension of the Indonesian nation's identity and the principle of *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* as a unifying concept has the capacity to mitigate the prevalence of heightened polarization. This can be achieved by implementing open dialogue initiatives before the election, such as broadcast programs and discourse places at universities, city hall meetings, or other civil forums. The objective is to nurture understanding and acceptance of diverse identities within Indonesian society. Ultimately, the researcher proposed promoting and regulating responsible journalism and obeying ethical standards in the distribution of news that deviates from the truth or has the potential to incite identity conflicts. This can be achieved through the involvement of journalism organizations and the implementation of fact-checking procedures by authorized governments to wipe out false information.

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