The European Union (EU) has become an increasingly important global actor, especially after Cold War. Lahdensuo notes that since January 2003 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has been engaged in several missions including in the Former Yugoslav Republic, the Democratic of Congo, Middle East, and Aceh-Indonesia as the first ever the EU’s succeed mission in South East Asia based on soft power approached.1

The EU’s mission in Aceh has been monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement between the Indonesia Government and Free Aceh Movement (GAM). In this peace agreement

process there have been several actions taken particularly in the security hand over and destruction of weapons. Subsequently, EU mission in Aceh was important test for the Union’s ability to apply some of the security policy instruments it envisaged under the Helsinki goals which The aim of the CSDP is to give to the EU a politico-military capability for purely European operations where the US and/or NATO do not want to be involved, for example, for peacekeeping and other military and security tasks, without undermining the importance of NATO as the provider of territorial defence for most Member States.  

Although it is limited in scope and time, this ESDP engagements have given the EU added confidence and are the first hand-on manifestation of the externalization of the EU through a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) dimension, which may lead to more ambitious interventions in the future.

The EU’s common foreign and security policy it launched when the Maastricht Treaty on EU signed in February 1992 and came into force since November 1993, with this treaty the Member States upgraded their joint capacity for foreign policy co-operation by assembling new instruments and decision making procedures under the label of the common foreign and security policy in second pillar of EU/EC. One of the objectives of the Union as emphasized in the Maastricht Treaty as Nuttal notes that “to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense”.  

Therefore, the EU’s civilian crisis management is an evolving concept, which has been positively promoted and developed during recent years. The first EU civilian crisis mission started in 2003 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then extended to Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Democratic of Congo and Aceh. Yet, in Aceh, the EU’s mission through Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) has been an interesting challenge from the outset. The AMM is exceptional from at least two points of views. Firstly, the AMM is the first EU civilian mission in Asia ever and, secondly; it is considered to be purely a civil monitoring mission with a unique background and task. Another exceptional feature of the Aceh peace process is that it is an outcome of a process, which combines a private diplomacy process and a crisis management mission by regional organizations and governments. As a result, it has required exceptionally smooth collaboration between civil society and intergovernmental actors. Notwithstanding, through the AMM, the EU embarked upon its first ESDP mission in Asia. According to Fieth, AMM efforts at helping solve the conflict in Aceh were part of the EU’s broader policy goal of strengthening security and stability in the region. Furthermore, Fieth argues that the EU led AMM was a concrete expression of the EU’s commitment, not only to the peace process in Aceh, but also to peace and long-term development in Indonesia and the region as a whole. It shows, the European Union involvement in the success of Aceh peace process. The EU also funded the Crisis Management Initiative which success a mediation role leading to the signing of a peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia (Gol) and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Free Aceh Movement (GAM).

Meanwhile, the overall objective of the AMM is to assist the Gol and GAM in the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Therefore, the Commission provided assistance in support of the immediate reintegration needs of ex-GAM combatants and political prisoners and to villages/communities of return (small infrastructure, livelihoods). This objective is to encourage the development of the rule of law and democracy in Aceh.
Historical Conflict in Aceh

After Indonesia declared its independence, the nominally still existing sultanate of Aceh was abolished and the territory incorporated into the province of North Sumatra. Because of unending protests by the Acehnese people, the Indonesian government was forced and promised in 1959 to grant Aceh a greater degree of autonomy. However, this promise was not ever fulfilled in reality until recently. This unfulfilled promise in the past had created a great deal of resentment and disappointment the Acehnese at that time.

The frustrated intentions of the Acehnese in exercising their right to self-determination was later emphasized by the establishment of Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), to be later renamed Free Aceh Movement, and even later known as GAM, was founded on 4 December 1976 by Hasan Tiro, a descendant of the last sultan of Aceh. According to Schulze “GAM’s ideology was one of national liberation aimed at freeing Aceh from all political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the creation of an independent Acehnese state”.8

This movement became the defining factor in the armed political rebellion, and hence regarded as the renaissance of resistance tradition. In response, president Soeharto imposed martial law and intensified military intervention against this freedom movement and identified the province as a Military Operation Territory or Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM).9 This designation would remain with Aceh province throughout the anti-insurgency operations carried out from 1990-1998.

In his book Working for Conflict; Skills And Strategies for Actions, Fisher argues that the long continuing Aceh conflict (the so-called “Aceh War”) during the Soeharto regime, could be classified into two main forms of conflicts; underground conflict, known as ‘Pre-DOM period between 1976–1989, and the second, known as the ‘open conflict period,’ well-known as the post DOM, occurring between 1998–2003.10 According to Fisher, as quoted by Ishaq (2006, p. 70) on his essay about "The anatomy of Aceh conflict", even if GAM was proclaimed a long time ago (on its independence day in December 04, 1976 by Hasan Tiro), it did not echo to all areas at the time. It was opined that GAM only gained in popularity shortly after the period of DOM implementation in 1989.

Since early 1998, after the collapse of the Soeharto regime, the euphoria of the reform movement in Indonesia made room for the birth of student protest movements to launch the public political demand for the withdrawal of the DOM status in the province. This was followed by the establishment of the human right rehabilitation for the victims of the conflicts. As the regime changed, President Abdurrahman Wahid ended the martial law in Aceh in 1998, but armed conflict continued between the combatants of the Aceh freedom movements and Indonesian security forces (TNI).11 Predictably, both sides between GAM and TNI could be claimed that has committed serious human right abuses.

The Long Road of The Peace Talks

The long enduring conflict involving the TNI troops and the GAM combatants was for the first time brought to the negotiation table in the year 1999. The first peace negotiation process mediated by the Henry Dunant Center (HDC), a Geneva based humanitarian organization, was aimed at ending the over 30 years of internal conflict which had killed approximately more than 10,000 people (Huber, 2004, p.6). Consequently, a Joint Understanding Humanitarian Pause for Aceh was signed by both parties on May 12, 2000. The main goals for this mission were to provide humanitarian assistance for the people of Aceh by minimising the military activities from both sides, and promoting trust and confidence amongst both groups, in order to implement a peaceful solution (Human Right Watch, 2008).

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Unfortunately, the political instability during the regime of President Wahid hindered both parties from successfully implementing the Humanitarian Paused Agreement. Considering the powerful role of the military in Indonesian politics, President Wahid failed in enacting aspects of the agreement to which the military were obliged to fulfill. Eventually, due to strong pressure of military leaders, the number of TNI involved in the conflict was increased by order of the Presidential Instruction (Instruksi President)—(Inpres) No. 4 on April 11, 2001. The Instruction recognized that the efforts at resolving the Aceh conflict through dialogue with the GAM separatists had produced no results and that level of violence were increasing.  

Even if the joint agreements were considered practically ineffective by both parties; mutual efforts prompted the extension of the agreement on two occasions. During these extension periods, meetings between the GoI and GAM succeeded in returning both parties to the discussion table in Geneva. The “continually stopping and then starting again” meetings failed to achieve an agreement as a result of the crisis of trust between the both parties. Both groups suspected each other of having no political will in achieving the long lasting peace desired.  

Although previous peace talks were not as successful as hoped, the peace process was not abandoned, and continued until the next presidential era. Megawati, the successor to president Wahid continued with a non-military approach by starting other peace negotiations in February 2002. As Sukma describes that a successful of the negotiation was finally signed by the Cessation of Hostility Agreement (CoHA) in December 2002. However, as in the previous case, President Megawati also faced strong pressure from several domestic institutions—including the Indonesian Military—to increase the number of military forces in Aceh. The military argued that the humanitarian approach was an ineffective approach to dealing with the Aceh conflict. As a result of the pressure, the Presidential Decree No. 28/2003 on Martial Law was issued. This law was recognized to have had an adverse impact on the conflict because of the sheer increase in the number of human rights violations in Aceh province. The worsening situation in Aceh made it more difficult to achieve a negotiated settlement, which CoHA in practice was ineffectual, and eventually abandoned.

The EU and Peace Building in Aceh

Following the operations conducted in Bosnia Herzegovina, Congo, Middle East and other regions in the world, the EU mission in Aceh—Indonesia was the first ever CFSP/ESDP mission in Asia. This mission launched to monitor the implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of peace agreement between the Indonesia Government and free Aceh movement, the aim of which is to restore peace in Aceh—Indonesia.

This EU mission represents an invaluable opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its capacity to rapidly launch a complex CFSP/ESDP mission over long distances of Europe, and it was focused to conduct the decommissioning, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, redeployment of non-organic Indonesian military forces, as well as post-tsunami reconstruction in an effort to achieve sustainable security and development in the region. It also adopted its EU first common security strategy in 2003 and the European Security Strategy (ESS) which stressed the EU’s global role as a credible and effective actor, as Solana states that “the EU should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world”. As a result, the EU mission in Aceh through AMM Prospects”, in H. Soesastro, A.L. Smith, & H. M. Ling (Eds.), Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presidency, (Jakarta: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Publisher, 2003).


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provides an opportunity to put the capabilities of the CFSP/ESDP into practice in worldwide.

The Helsinki Peace Process
The people in Aceh have endured all the sufferings associated with conflicts during the more than thirty years of bloody confrontations between the GoI and GAM. Therefore, the terrible disaster of the 26th of December 2004 tsunami and the earthquake which took the lives of approximately 170,000 people had further complicated the condition and suffering in Aceh. Hence, within the context of the post-tsunami environment, the heightened sense of urgency to resolve the conflict for an everlasting peace came to the fore and this galvanized the international community into action.17

Despite the former attempts at reaching peace deals there was the sense that the right conditions for a long lasting peace simply did not exist prior to 2005. This pessimism however, did not extinguish the desires of the main actors to find a peaceful solution in Aceh. Hence, Rathner & Hazdra argues that it is not an exaggeration when many politicians and scholars spoke of the most devastating tsunami and earthquake of December 2004 as a “Blessing in Disguise” in ending the conflict.18 Within a few hours of the undersea earthquake off the coast of Sumatra (measuring 9.1 on the Richter-scale) and the Tsunami that followed, ten times more people died than the number of people killed in the thirty year Aceh civil conflict, forcing the principal actors back to the negotiating table.

The peace process was facilitated by Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and supported by the EU Commission. Then, after eight months of negotiations and many rounds of talks in Finland, on August 15, 2005 the Indonesian government and GAM leader signed a MoU in Helsinki. The agreement brought an end to nearly thirty years of conflict that caused 15,000 victims, displaced tens of thousands, and negatively impacted the economic and political situation of the whole country.19

Moreover, Kingsbury describes that under the auspices of President Ahtisaari, the agreement covered a series of conditions mandated by both parties;

“GAM was required to disarm, handing its weapons over to the government security forces. The government of Indonesia promised a broader autonomy for Aceh including the right of the Ex-GAM members to independently establish local political parties and local government. This regional government was given control over the natural resources in the oil and gas-rich province. The parties sought to find a suitable monitoring body for the eventual agreement. For this aim, an Aceh Monitoring mission was established by the European Union. Five ASEAN contributing were given the mandate to create a monitoring task force that was to ensure the implementation of the terms of the peace agreement by both parties”.20

In general, this peace agreement between GoI and GAM, both of parties commit in the MoU to achieve a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh. Accordingly, Solana wrote that “the MoU details the agreement and the principles that will guide the political process in Aceh, covering the following topics inter alia political reform in Aceh, including a law on the governing of Aceh, political participation, economy and rule of law; human right; amnesty and re-integration of GAM members into society; establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission and agreement on a dispute settlement mechanism”.21

In short, contrary to the CoHA agreement of the previous peace process which consisted of an open—ended series of confidence building measures aimed at creating conditions for a final

settlement, the strength of the MoU was that the parties had reached an agreement on the core political and economic status of Aceh in relation to the central government, rule of law issues, political participation, and human rights. It was only made possible by the major concession of GAM to give up its armed resistance for independence and accept the offer for autonomy within Indonesia. As well as with involved the EU as the international actor on implementation.

The EU CFSP Contributes to Peace Keeping in Aceh

The EU Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) mission and then later called the EU monitoring Mission in Aceh (AMM), Indonesia, as one of the elements of the EU’s external action under CFSP/ESDP, and it marks as a remarkable short mission of the EU in Asia and a succeed cooperation with ASEAN states on establishing peace building in Aceh-Indonesia. Gifted with a strong mandate including monitoring demobilization, the decommissioning of arms, the withdrawal of government forces, the reintegration of former combatants and the launch of a new political process, this mission has so far provided an effective contribution in ending years of fighting and paving the way to sustainable peace.22

For the EU, the AMM also represented a test case for the newly established civilian crisis management mechanisms within the framework of the CFSP/ESDP in Asia and demonstrated the ability of the EU to live up to its vision of being a credible global actor in international politics as proclaimed in the European Security Strategy and also emphasized in Article 17.2 of the TEU, “questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and task of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”.23

Then, these missions also based on “Petersberg tasks” which ESDP missions are not limited to the military dimension but also include civilian tasks. The Petersberg tasks are an integral part of the European security and defense policy (ESDP) tasks of a humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization tasks.

According to Beeck (2007, pp. 20–1) the most EU civilian crisis management missions have so far been police missions or operations focusing on border assistance and the rule of law, such as the EU mission in Balkan. Meanwhile the AMM is unique because it is the EU’s first civilian mission in Asia and an exclusively civil monitoring mission established within the framework of ESDP while the Commission was involved inside. Then, the strategic guidance of the AMM fell under the responsibility of the European Council and it was also financed by the EU’s CFSP budget line as well as by contributions of participating countries. As a result, The AMM has been as important as the agreement to stabilize Aceh province. Unlike previous attempts to bring an end to the conflict, a significant international player was associated with the implementation of the agreement.

Background to the Mission

Following an official invitation by the Indonesian Government and fully supported by the GAM leadership, the EU decided to take up the challenge of its first mission in Asia. Basically, both parties who signed the MoU were learning from past experiences on the failure of previous peace agreements which the humanitarian pause and the CoHA in 2002 without involved of a strength international body as a guarantor on implementation the peace agreement.

The Helsinki MoU, therefore, agreed that the EU must be invited, and the Council took note of the report of the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) in July 2005, and finally welcomed the successful conclusion. It agreed that the EU was prepared in principle, to provide observers to monitoring implementation of the MoU, although, there was little enthusiasm for the launch of the envisaged operation from the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), while some EU countries such as Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and France, as well as Switzerland and Norway pushed for EU engagement for 22 Adam Burke & Patrick Baron, Supporting Peace in Aceh: Development Agencies and International Involvement, (USA: East West-Center Washington, 2008).
the mission. Then, together with five ASEAN countries, the EU mounted a monitoring mission called AMM in order to ensure that the memorandum is properly implemented.24

Referring to the EU Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP, the AMM was established on 9 September 2005 and practically, the monitoring team was deployed to properly start the mission as soon as the MoU was signed and took effect in September 15, 2005. The speed with which the operation was put together shows how much progress has been made on the ESDP during the last few years and testifies to the European Union’s commitment to carry on a peace keeping in a region of the world that has one through lots of suffering (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2008, p.129). However, at the same time, it was apparent that any vacuum between 15 August (when MoU signed) and the launch of AMM on 15 September could be potentially dangerous to the peace agreement. Then, the Council and Commission, with participation of the CMI, drew up a concept for an EU Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) to cover the gap.25

Moreover, The AMM was a civilian mission within the framework of the ESDP, and it was to be the first ESDP mission in Asia, far away from Europe neighbour, at 10,000 km from home. However the EU mission in Aceh was regarded as potentially beneficial in various respects, at least As Braud and Grevi described that:

“A mission in Indonesia would match the vision of those who regarded the Union as a global player, not limited to stabilizing its neighbourhood but nurturing more ambitious goals, and the mission would offer a test case for the functioning of the ESDP machinery for civil crisis management, and it particular of the newly established civil-military cell”.26

The development of civilian and military capabilities within ESDP both followed a similar method with priority given to rapid reaction response. The capability-building started by setting quantitative targets and holding pledging conferences where Member States committed a specific number of relevant national experts and it was only after this process was only after this process was started that the EU defined the purpose of the capabilities.27 Then, the AMM was formally a civilian operation, but in practice it could be seen as a mixed mission that engaged in the planning phase of the Civ-Mil cell, its resources and unique capabilities combining Council and Commission officials. The Civ-Mil cell thus fully involved already in a fact-finding this mission.

Obviously, it appears that the AMM as the first CFSP/ESDP mission in Asia has extremely interesting and innovative approach to externalization of the EU CFSP, which mandated a variety of military and civilian tasks. The AMM has conducted monitoring and supporting the parties of the MoU with disarmament, reintegration, human right, new legislation, withdrawal the military forces and many other demanding political issues.28 Hence, the EU crisis management mission was delivered good result for the region as well as succeeded of CFSP/ESDP operation in Asia region in establishing peace, democracy and human right. Despite it was new challenge for the EU become the global actor in the world.29

Mission Mandate and the Features
The CFSP/ESDP acting on its challenges, in September 2005, officially the EU launched the AMM as a civilian crisis management operation, acting as a facilitator and as a supporter to the parties in their effort in creating a peaceful solution for the Aceh conflict. This led to a Council decision in September to establish the EU’s first ever crisis management operation in Asia, as the Council expresses that this mission is:

“An important role played by the AMM, which will conclude its mandate on September 2005, in monitoring and supporting the peace

28 Burke & Baron, 2008, p. 15.
29 Ibid., p. 15.
The overall objective of the AMM was to assist the GoI and the former GAM in the implementation of the MoU for the first six month period of its initial mandate starting shortly after its coming in to being from 15 September 2005 until 15 March 2006 and followed by a period of extension for three months until December 15 June 2006. In accordance with this, it was clearly stated in the MoU that AMM was mandated in the joint action under main tasks in the peace keeping mission. Then, the AMM's primary task was to monitor the decommissioning, disarmaments and demobilizations (DDR) of former GAM combatants as well as to rule on disputed amnesty cases. The withdrawal of the non-local TNI and police troops from Aceh was also another task mandated by the MoU. Hence, it represents a new test for the EU's capacity to handle post-conflict management which providing key lessons on DDR practice that will hopefully also contribute towards the formulation of a comprehensive DDR concept.

Meanwhile, the integration and reconciliation process are not really objectives of CFSP/ESDP, but respond to the external action of the Commission framework to stabilize post crisis situations. So, the EU mission in Aceh was also a good example of how practical collaboration between the Commission and the Council can strengthen the impact of an ESDP operation in Aceh-Indonesia in particular.

These points, indeed has achieved incredible success under AMM in implementing its tasks mandated by the MoU as well the result of TEU and ESS. To this fact, under the comprehensive monitoring of the AMM, a total of 840 weapons were successfully handed in by the ex members of GAM by the end of 2005. The executions of the disarmaments were done in four stages from September to December 2005. Following this success was the monitoring of the withdrawal of the non-local TNI and Police troops from Aceh, amounting on 25,890 and 5,791 respectively. This mission was completely executed within the period of September to December 2005.

In addition to the above tasks, the GoI was given responsible under MoU to provide the economic support to Ex-GAM combatants, affected civilians and amnestied political prisoners. To fulfill this task, the AMM provided it's monitoring towards empowerment and social support related programmes launched by the government of Indonesia and with the assistances of other cooperated partners like International Organization of Migration (IOM) and World Bank. In order to ensure that the empowerment program worked out successfully to the approximately 3000 ex GAM combatants, the AMM team were verily involved in field monitoring covering all districts and sub districts in all over Aceh province.

Furthermore, AMM was tasked to ensure the establishment of human rights under the terms of the MoU during the process of the reintegration of former GAM combatants. By involving its district level offices, the AMM team monitored human right abuses that occurred during the implementation of MoU in 2005. According to the AMM conducted investigations and discussions with relevant authorities for to enhance trust building among the parties. Moreover, it also meant at strengthening the awareness of civil society groups and national institutions on the field of human rights. At the same time, the commission of AMM was mandated on providing the assistances of monitoring the process of legislative changes under the Law on the Governing of Aceh, while was mandated as the major tasks of the AMM, its main goal was to contribute to bringing the security, stability,

32 Ibid., p. 36.
economic development and social justice back to the province.35

If it compared to many traditional observation missions, it appears that the AMM constituted a flexible approach to be verified and designed to respond maximally to the need of the former adversaries. It also marked as its excellent example of mutually reinforcing co-operation with ASEAN member countries on issues on regional peace and security.

Initially, based on the MoU proposed, the AMM was not a military operation but a civilian mission; its members did not carry weapons. Practically, its 230 unarmed personnel was comprised of 130 personnel from EU member countries and 100 personnel from the ASEAN states distributed in mixed teams throughout 11 districts offices with an operational headquarters in Banda Aceh. However, most of the members had military background as this was necessary to perform certain technical actions required in the field. Therefore, The Head of Mission reported to the Council of the European Union through the Political and Security Committee and to Javier Solana, Secretary General/High Representative of the Council of the EU on matters related to the AMM, as well as to the parties, the CMI, and the contributing countries on possible violations of the MoU.37

Meanwhile, on the financial issue, the AMM was one of the greatest challenges. There was no consensus among the Member States and it was potentially deployment in Aceh was further complicate by the fact that the EU’s “complicated and cumbersome procedures and budgetary process would not allow for the deployment of a fully-fledged AMM on 15 August”. Nevertheless, The EU Commission’s External Relations Directorate General proceeded to draft a proposal for financing the mission in July 2005. Then, this proposal suggested that the Commission would fund the mission through a grant to a Member States. Subsequently, the first part of the AMM mission funded by the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), while the salaries of the staff would be funded by Member States. The Commission, however, could not legally finance those parts of the mission which were military in nature such as DDR operation, meanwhile the Council argued that “from a legal standpoint, the RRM could not finance a crisis management operation pertaining to CFSP objectives, and not those of the EC”.38

From the reaction of the Council, it became clear that it saw the Commission’s proposal as a takeover bid for the mission chain of command. Then, it was only Javier Solana’s personal intervention that swung the debate in favour of EU deployment and financing it from the CFSP budget. However, out of a total budget of €15 million, the CFSP could only cover €9 million and the rest had to be provided by willing and able some of Member States.39

As the implementation of the AMM mandate; however, the political aspect and law in Aceh dramatically changed, a new law on the Governing of Aceh, incorporating provision of the 15 August 2005 peace agreement, was drafted in consultation with broad sectors of the Acehnese public and the GAM, enacted by national parliament and then signed by the President of Indonesia on 01 August 2006. As a result, the democracy system was established by the first ever direct local elections were held on 11 December 2006 where a former GAM fighter, Irwandi Yusuf, secure a comfortable majority and was inaugurated as the first directly elected governor of Aceh on 08 February 07. The elections were monitored by European Union election observers who generally confirmed that they were free and fair.


Finally, despite in the first time of the mission suffered a number of challenges and problems, particularly the mismatch between the limited time frame for setting up the mission and also the far lengthier and highly bureaucratic funding process in Brussels. But, all of these tasks have been creating the peace stabilization in Aceh, particularly in term of human rights, justice, democracy and good government for the region. The following part of election for local government which former ex-combant took position will have a close look at the impact credibly on peace stabilization after the mission in Aceh.

Conclusion
The mission of the EU throught AMM has been monitoring and supporting the parties of the MoU with disarmament, reintegration, human rights, new legislation, and many other demanding political issues. The AMM is also an important part of the EU’s capacity building in the field of CCM. The civilian mission expertise for the purposes of peace-building is a relatively new phenomenon. It is imperative that the capacity of the international community to meet the needs of peace building and crisis management is strengthened. As a result, The EU mission in Aceh showed this expertise had been successful in running their task in the field.

The EU mission in Aceh also as an effort of externalization of the EU’s influences in region which it had demonstrated its ability to mobilize its crisis management instrument within ESDP likewise the EU has done in Congo, Balkan and other regions in the world. Furthermore, the joint mission with five ASEAN countries had strengthened its position in Asia and helped to develop relations with the Indonesian Government.

In addition, the AMM represented a traditional foreign policy instrument with the goal of promoting the strategic economic, political and security interests of the European Union, as mentioned at the ESS paper that the EU “should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world”. As a result, the externalization of CFSP through AMM provided a reality for the EU to put the words of the strategy into practice.

References


